Security
Lovable AI-built apps left private data open (2026-11-04)
An investigation into apps built with Lovable found private information accessible without logging in. The SAZ Labs short describes work by German security firm Crissy Field with the newspaper Handelsblatt. They checked 159,041 Lovable projects and found 7,403 sites where tables containing email addresses could be read without authentication. The finding concerns the access settings of the resulting applications.
The examples in the script go beyond email addresses. One service exposed more than 1,000 passport records, while a forum left over 200,000 chat messages open. These examples show why database permissions matter to the people whose information an app holds. A working interface does not, by itself, demonstrate that the data behind it is restricted to the intended audience.
The firm says it cannot tell whether the exposed data was misused. That limit is important. Accessibility and confirmed misuse are different findings, and the supplied account establishes the former without claiming the latter. The numbers describe what the investigation could read, not a confirmed count of records stolen or people harmed by an attacker.
The problem identified in the short is database access settings that were never locked down. It is therefore useful to distinguish creating an app from checking who can access its information. The brief does not describe an exploit that bypassed correctly configured permissions. It describes private data being left available through settings that did not enforce the intended restrictions.
Lovable’s terms place responsibility for the app and its data on the customer, according to the source. For a team handling real customer information, the short’s message is to get the application reviewed. That review needs to consider the information being stored and the access it permits, alongside whether the app appears to work. The investigation illustrates the gap between a functioning product and one whose private data is actually private. Watch the original short below for the reported figures, examples, and the explicit limit on what is known about misuse.
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